Hans Aarsleff, «Taine and Saussure», Yale Review 68/1 (1978), p. 71-81 ; version augmentée publiée dans From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1982, p. 356-371 ; en fr. : « Taine : son importance pour Saussure et le structuralisme », Romantisme 25/26 (1979), p. 35-48 (accès libre). Version anglaise reprise dans Ferdinand de Saussure, ed. John E. Joseph, London / New York, Routledge, 2013.

[…]
In De l’idéal dans l’art (1867), Taine had already introduced and developed the concept of [357] valeur as a feature that is characteristic of an epoch in the history of art; the historian must note the changes of value between epochs, for such changes create new systems.4 In Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale (1916) valeur also plays an important role. English sheep and French mouton can have the same significations, but not the same valeur. Each word has its place in the system that determines its value. 5
In the chapter on “La valeur linguistique,” Saussure also made a statement that has now been cited so often that it has become a commonplace, like a key to his linguistic thought: “Language can also be compared to a sheet of paper: thought is the recto and sound the verso; we cannot cut one side without also cutting the other. So also in language, sound cannot be isolated from thought, or thought from sound.”6 The linguistic sign is a psychic entity with two surfaces, intimately related and recalling one another. Everyone knows that he called them the signifiant and the signifié. This principle and the striking metaphor that illustrates it are also in Taine’s great work.
[…]
Near the end of the first volume of De l’intelligence Taine came to the crucial point in his argument: how do physical and mental events connect? Many philosophers, he said, have argued that these two kinds of events are heterogeneous; they say that the image is internal while the sensation comes from the outside. Since they perpetually diverge, no common point can be found. Taine answers that they are not different events, but a single event known under two different [358] aspects. This explanation satisfies Taine because it does not rely on any imaginary or unknown third element. He concludes that the two kinds of separate events previously postulated are always of necessity bound together, “for as soon as they are reduced to a single event with two aspects, it is clear that they are like the verso and recto of a surface, and that the presence or absence of one incontrovertibly entails that of the other. We have a single event with two faces, one mental, the other physical, one accessible to the understanding, the other to the senses.” 10 The sheet is his metaphor for the “central event” that “communicates its character to the rest.”
But what, he asks, “is the value of each of the two points of view?” That of the understanding (conscience) is always direct, the image of the sensation within us, for Taine materially located in the constitution of the brain. But the other aspect, that of external perception, is indirect, for it never gives knowledge of the physical object itself: “In itself this physical and sensible object remains altogether unknown; we know nothing about it except the group of sensations it provokes in us… that is to say their constant effects on us, their fixed accompaniments, their signs, nothing but signs, signs and tokens of things unknown.” Taine continued: “Thus there is a great difference between the two points of view. By the understanding I attain the fact in itself; by sense I attain only a sign. A sign of what? What is it that is always accompanied, denoted, signified by the internal motion of the nervous centers? …it is the sensation, the image, the internal mental event.” Sharing Saussure’s well-known fondness for dichotomies, Taine has analyzed the sign into the purely mental signifié and the invariably linked signifiant (a term Taine does not use), which, coming from the outside, to us appears physical. We now understand, “why the mental event, being single, must appear double to us; the sign and the event signified are two things that can neither become one nor be separated, and their distinction is as necessary as their connection. But in regard to this distinction and this connection, the advantage is entirely on the side of the mental event; it alone exists. The physical event is merely the manner in which it affects or could affect our senses.”11
It is evident that Taine’s analysis contains all the elements of Saussure’s doctrine of signs. For both Taine and Saussure the full range of signs included more than words, but both concentrated on words as the chief kind of mental images. As for Taine, Saussure’s “images acoustiques” are only instruments of thought, but in themselves they are nothing until they become “des entités linguistiques” by being joined to concepts. At one point Saussure says that this “unité à deux [359] faces” has been compared to “the unity of the human person, composed of body and soul,”—though he prefers to think of it as the union of hydrogen and oxygen in the chemical constitution of water.12
We may find this analogy unhappy, but it still shows that Saussure understood what Taine was talking about and that he sought a scientific image that falls into line with Taine’s orientation. This preference for scientific illustrations —for crystallization, glaciers, moraines, geological layers, mineralogy, anatomy, spiral shapes, physiology, and “les formules de la science”—is a constant reminder that Saussure was working within the conceptual milieu of Taine’s thought. When Saussure said that “without the aid of signs, we would be unable to distinguish two ideas in a clear and certain manner,” that “there are no pre-established ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language,” he was following Taine’s argument—and as Taine acknowledged, Condillac’s. For Taine, the joining of sound and concept formed what Saussure called “a complex unity, physiological and mental.”13
The two features I have dealt with bring Taine and Saussure so closely together that it would be implausible to argue that the young French-speaking Genevan did not know Taine’s work. ↓
4 ↑ Philosophie de l’art, 13th ed. in two vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1909) was after 1882 the general title of the work that comprised the five series of lectures, previously published separately, that Taine gave at the École des Beaux-Arts, beginning in 1865. De l’idéal dans l’art is here in vol. II, 221-346. See passim, but, e.g., p. 234: “In the world of imagination as well as in the world of reality there are different levels because there are different values,” and p. 268: “I am speaking of historical epochs. The system of ideas and sentiments that filled a human head in the time of Louis XIV was altogether different from what it is today.”
5 ↑ Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, ed. Tullio de Mauro (Paris: Payot, 1973), pp. 154-169 “La valeur linguistique.” 160: “Forming part of a system, it is endowed not only with a signification but also with a value, and that is something quite different.” P. 157: “Values actually remain entirely relative… the arbitrariness of the sign makes us understand better why the social fact alone can create a linguistic system. The collectivity is necessary for the creation of values.” Since this is the text that has made Saussure’s thought known and influential, the “vulgate” text so to speak (hereafter referred to as Cours), this is the text I have used unless otherwise noted. In spite of de Mauro’s useful and extensive exploration of Saussure’s intellectual background, he never mentions Taine; the same is true for the rest of the literature, now very large, on Saussure. I have also used Rudolf Engler’s variorum, “édition critique” of the Cours (Vol. I, fasc. 1-3, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1967-1968; vol. II, fasc. 4, 1974). This immense and byzantine edition (hereafter referred to as Engler, ed., Cours) offers a wealth of evidence that supports my argument, but too extensive and detailed to present here.
6 ↑ Cours, p. 157. Cf. p. 99: “Thus the linguistic sign is a psychic entity with two sides.”
[…]
10 ↑ De l’intelligence, I, 329. This passage was first published in “Les vibrations cérébrales et la pensée’’ in Revue philosophique 3 (Jan. 1877), p. 7 (where the entire article covers pp. 1-9); it was then included in De l’intelligence in the 3rd (1878) and following editions.
11 ↑ De l’intelligence, I, 329-331.
12 ↑ Cours, p. 145.
13 ↑ Cours, p. 155, 24. Cf. Engler, ed., Cours, I, 16 (in G 3.44a, 89): “It would have been better if linguists had found their ideas elsewhere, perhaps in the natural sciences. Perhaps the scientific tendency would have dawned sooner.”
Extrait de l’article, p. 356-359
Cette dernière phrase — tirée de l’un des essais saussuriens les plus connus de Hans Aarsleff (1925–2026) — referme tout un réseau serré de correspondances textuelles entre De l’intelligence et le Cours, et illustre bien son style argumentatif : une érudition minutieuse mise au service d’une affirmation tranchée, présentée comme inéluctable. Le travail d’Aarsleff a eu le mérite de remettre en question, comme c’est le cas ici, la notion même d’« influence » dans l’histoire des idées linguistiques — suspendue, comme toujours, entre l’évidence de la donnée philologique, la réticence de la donnée archivistique et la conjecture de la donnée biographique. C’est précisément sur ce terrain que, à partir de 2003, puis lors d’un échange public dans les pages du Times Literary Supplement (John E. Joseph, «Root and Branch: Pictet’s Role in the Crystallization of Saussure’s Thought», n. 5258, 9 janvier 2004, p. 12-13 ; Hans Aarsleff, «Duality the Key: Saussure’s Debt to Taine in Conceiving « The Double Essence of Language »», n. 5290, 20 août 2004, p. 12-13 ; accès institutionnel, via Gale TLS Historical Archive), a été proposée, pour les mêmes idées, une généalogie alternative. Que la dette précise envers Taine soit démontrée ou seulement suggérée, la communauté des saussuriens continuera d’en débattre ; mais c’est bien dans cette capacité à susciter un désaccord fécond — substituant au mythe du fondateur la reconstitution d’une généalogie longue, faite d’étapes provisoires — que se mesure la marque d’un chercheur qui aura vraiment compté.
Une bibliographie des écrits de Hans Aarsleff se trouve dans «Language in Intellectual History: The Work of Hans Aarsleff», numéro spécial de History of European Ideas 42/6 (2016), p. 852–854 (accès libre).






